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Strategic Incentives for Complementary Producers to 
Innovate for Efficiency and Support Sustainability 
 
 
Paul W. Dobson1, Ratula Chakraborty 





Process innovation that increases operational efficiency through a step change improvement in 
resource utilisation and waste reduction can help boost manufacturing profitability but also 
offer broader social and environmental benefits.  Business owners, though, might be reluctant 
to make investments in process innovation unless they serve a pure profit motive.  While not 
guided by altruistic intentions, the owners might nonetheless see a strategic benefit in providing 
their managers with remuneration incentives supported by public commitments to increase 
innovation effort for more efficient, lean and sustainable operations.  We model such a 
possibility amongst producers controlling the supply of essential complementary components 
that go into the assembly of competitively produced composite finished goods.  We 
demonstrate the ruinous effect of independent strategic delegation to managers of powerful 
complementary producers.  Instead, collaboration amongst the owners of the complementary 
producers to establish common managerial incentives can increase innovative effort to raise 
efficiency that benefits the whole industry supply chain, end consumers, and social welfare.  
Government-backed voluntary agreements with sector-wide commitments may be helpful in 
encouraging process innovation to support lean supply chains and sustainability. 
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Process innovation that improves efficiency can help raise profitability but also provide 
wider societal benefits. Business owners, employees, consumers and the environment can all 
potentially share in the benefits from innovation that increases operational efficiency, raises 
resource utilisation, cuts waste, and lowers costs (Florida 1996; King and Lennox 2001; Piercy 
and Rich 2015). Thus, we might expect firms to be very strongly motivated to pursue process 
innovation for the advantages conferred on their own rganisation through improved efficiency 
and competitiveness, but also encouraged by the magnitude of the broader benefits afforded to 
external stakeholders and society at large. 
Nevertheless, all of this assumes that firms actually want and are prepared to pay for 
improved efficiency, which can require substantial investment and effort in process innovation. 
Business owners will obviously be deterred from undertaking such investments if the unit cost 
savings generated are not sufficient to cover the upfront investment expenditure. Yet, within a 
supply chain context, business owners might have oth r considerations that deter them as well. 
In particular, the mutual interdependence amongst firms in a supply chain means that an 
innovating firm might not fully appropriate the rewards from its own investment, as other 
parties can benefit as well. Specifically, the whole supply chain stands to gain from reduced 
costs if these allow for lower final prices and increased demand and sales. This can give rise to 
a free-rider problem and coordination failure, where ach firm leaves it to others in the supply 
chain to incur the investment to reduce costs. If all parties think the same way then no one will 
innovate, cost savings will not materialise, and industry and social benefits will be lost.  
In practice, two aspects can mitigate this free-ridr problem. First, competition can act as 
a driver for implementing process innovation, where own survival in avoiding displacement by 
a more efficient rival takes priority over concerns about free riding by other parties in the 
supply chain. Secondly, contractual solutions might be possible whereby beneficiaries share the 
costs and rewards of process innovation. In particular, a pair of trading parties successively 
linked in a supply chain might recognise that both s and to gain from their own and each 
other’s efforts to reduce costs, so agree as part of their trading contract to share investment 
costs and/or revenues (Gilbert and Cvsa 2003; Iida 2012). 
What happens, though, if there is no competitive thr at and parties cannot contract with 
each other? This paper considers precisely this situation in a supply chain where the critical 
parties are (upstream) monopoly component suppliers that provide essential complementary 















For example, the essential components could be hardware (e.g. an Intel processor) and software 
(e.g. a Microsoft operating system) required in the competitive production of personal 
computers. Here, any investment that one component supplier makes to reduce its operating 
costs and pass on lower prices to boost demand provides a direct benefit to another 
complementary component supplier, which can simply raise its prices correspondingly to leave 
sales at their original level but gain profit via its ncreased unit margin. With both component 
suppliers thinking the same way then they will both underinvest in cost-reduction effort. 
Furthermore, secure in their monopoly positions then there will be no competitive spur for 
them to innovate. Moreover, since they do not trade dir ctly with each other, but instead lie 
horizontally (i.e. side-by-side) at the same level in the supply chain, then they will not have 
trading contracts with each other upon which they could add in agreements on sharing costs 
and benefits from innovation. How then, in the absence of competition or formal contractual 
solutions, could they limit free-riding behaviour to minimise the underinvestment problem? 
We address this question by modelling a supply chain situation featuring complementary 
monopoly to consider differences between independent (non-cooperative) behaviour and 
collaborative (cooperative) behaviour. We contrast outcomes resulting from profit maximising 
behaviour with outcomes resulting from the business owners giving their managers 
remuneration contracts that have an explicit element r lating to the amount of cost-reduction 
achieved through process innovation. We demonstrate how independent strategic delegation 
can exacerbate underinvestment in innovation. Instead, we show how owners’ collaboration to 
establish common incentives can help the complementors increase innovation and benefit the 
whole supply chain, end consumers, and raise social welfare. We draw on these findings to 
discuss how industry standards, voluntary agreements and self-regulation could work to support 
welfare-raising collaboration. In particular, we see an important role that government can play 
in encouraging sector-wide commitments to innovation-led efficiency that promote lean supply 
chains and sustainability, such as the UK government-sponsored Courtauld Commitments for 
the UK food industry (WRAP 2011; 2017; Quinn 2017). The central tenet is that innovation-led 
efficiency-enhancing approaches give rise to sustainability. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section relates the paper to the extant 
literature. Section 3 set outs the modelling framework and game structure. Section 4 examines 
the non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes for prfit maximising behaviour. Section 5 
shows how the outcomes change with independent and cooperative strategic delegation by 
business owners, either rewarding or penalising innovation effort by managers. Section 6 















2. Related Literature 
The model and analysis in the paper draws on three distinct and currently separate 
literatures covering strategic interdependence amongst complementary producers, strategic 
delegation models involving process innovation, andinnovation-led efficiency linked to lean 
operations and sustainability. 
The building block of our analysis is Cournot’s (1838, Ch. IX) model of side-by-side 
market power examining the price-setting behaviour f two complementary monopolists 
(copper and zinc) selling all their output in fixed proportions to a competitive industry 
manufacturing a composite commodity (brass). This es entially represents the first formal 
model of a manufacturing business system (Dobson 2006). The model is relevant to an array of 
policy debates, notably property rights policy (Heller 2008) and patent policy (Spulber 2017), 
and applications like bundling (Nalebuff 2003). More generally, the Cournot model helps 
appreciate the tension facing complementary firms with non-aligned incentives for cooperating 
(to increase the pool of available profits) and competing (over the division of profits) 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Yoffie and Kwak 2006).  
The second stream of literature directly relevant to our analysis concerns strategic 
delegation models where business owners incentivise and delegate decision-making authority 
to managers as a commitment device (Fershtman and Judd 1987; Sengul et al. 2012). In respect 
of strategic delegation to induce cost-reducing R&D, Zhang and Zhang (1997) and Kopel and 
Riegler (2006) employ a complex multi-stage game structure where managers’ operational 
decisions are sequenced, with innovation outcomes undertaken and the level of success 
becoming common knowledge before output decisions are made. Both papers have managerial 
contracts based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, which, while common in 
the strategic delegation literature, do not directly incentivise innovation effort. 
In contrast, our approach follows Overvest and Veldman (2008), Veldman et al. (2014), 
and Veldman and Gaalman (2015) who examine strategic delegation to promote cost-reducing 
innovation effort in Cournot oligopoly. Their approach has several attractions. First, their 
models use a straightforward two-stage game structure, where owners set managerial contracts 
in the first stage and then managers make operational decisions in the second stage, with 
strategic behaviour squarely focused on the managerial contracts. Secondly, the manager 
contracts take the simple and intuitive form of a linear combination of profit and innovation 
outcomes (measured by the extent of success in reducing nit costs). Thirdly, all the operational 















closed-form solutions that are easy to interpret.  
However, our paper differs from theirs in several key respects. First, our focus is on 
perfect complements in a supply chain compared to theirs on perfect substitutes in a 
homogenous final goods oligopoly. Second, strategic interaction works in the opposite manner, 
where softening competition and colluding is about raising prices in oligopoly but lowering 
them in complementary monopoly. Third, firms compete in outputs in Cournot oligopoly but in 
prices in Cournot complementary monopoly. Fourth, wile in both cases these variables are 
strategic substitutes (i.e. the best response functions slope downwards), the character of 
aggressive strategic behaviour through credible and visible commitments works in the opposite 
way. With Cournot oligopoly, strategic behaviour is about commitments that serve to raise the 
firm’s own output while obliging its rival to contract its output, assisted by strategically 
overinvesting in cost-reducing innovation to raise productive efficiency. In contrast, with 
Cournot complementary monopoly, aggressive strategic behaviour is about raising own price 
but obliging the rival to lower its price, assisted by strategically underinvesting in cost-reducing 
innovation to lower productive efficiency. The difference in these effects will have an 
important part to play in our model. Fifth, a further more subtle difference arises from the way 
that cost reduction efforts enter the profit functions we examine because they come via raising 
the profit margin, so directly influence quantity choices but only indirectly influence price 
choices. The upshot is that Cournot complementary monopoly is not the perfect dual problem 
of Cournot oligopoly, as often thought, which has some further effects on the results.1 
Additionally, there are two other relevant approaches in the strategic delegation literature 
involving R&D effort. First, Pal (2010) considers collusion and semi-collusion delegation in an 
oligopoly context, but with a sales weighted manageri l objective function. Second, Bárcena-
Ruiz and Garzón (2002), Pal (2012), and Poyago-Theotoky and Yong (2017) consider explicit 
pollution reduction objectives when emissions taxes are present, but also in the context of 
oligopoly rather than within a supply chain involving complementary producers.  
In addition to this research using game-theoretic modelling, we draw on insights from the 
burgeoning literature on innovation-led efficiency linked to lean supply chains and 
sustainability (Garza-Reyes 2015; Piercy and Rich 2015). In particular, we see a role for 
voluntary agreements to overcome industry reluctance to invest in reducing waste and adopting 
lean operations while promoting sustainability (Dashwood 2014; WRAP 2011; 2017). 
                                                 
1 Sonnenschein (1968) shows the duality between Cournot oligopoly and complementary monopoly, but assumes 















3. Model Set Up 
A composite manufactured good (say, brass) is competitively produced and assembled 
using two components (say, copper and zinc) in fixed and equal (1:1) proportions each supplied 
by a monopolist, indexed by i, j = 1, 2, i ≠ j. The components have no other use other than in 
the manufacture of the composite good. The unit coss f making the composite good are a 
linear sum of the two component unit prices, respectiv ly p1 and p2, and constant unit assembly 
costs at a rate of k per unit. The composite good industry is perfectly ompetitive and the 
manufactured good is sold to consumers at combined unit cost, such that its price per unit, 
denoted by P, is the linear sum of the two component unit prices and the assembly unit cost, i.e. 
P = p1 + p2 + k. The composite good industry faces linear consumer demand, with indirect 
demand in the general linear form expressed as P = a – bQ, where a, b > 0 and Q is the total 
number of units sold, so that direct demand is Q = (a – P)/b = (a – p1 – p2 – k)/b. 
The component monopolists each set a fixed per unit price, as a posted non-negotiable 
price which is visible to the whole industry and applies to all units supplied. They both produce 
to order by letting the composite industry determine the quantity required, respectively q1 and 
q2, for the given component unit prices.
2 With the composite good being made in equal 
proportions and with normalised units then Q = q1 = q2.  
In producing and supplying their respective goods, each component monopolist faces 
constant unit costs, but the level, , can be influenced by process innovation effort. However, 
investment costs for process innovation are high and with diminishing returns. Specifically, 
existing technology and processes provides a base level unit cost rate at ̅ but then each 
component monopolist can implement process innovatin which lowers unit cost by the amount 
 	(> 0) , so  = ̅ −  , at the investment cost of  = 
/2 . The cost improvement 
parameter, , is common to both firms and reflects the degree of difficulty and expense in 
implementing process innovation, where we assume  ≥ 2, as sufficient to ensure non-negative 
prices in all considered cases (and where  < 1  rules out all cases). The technology and 
processes that each component producer uses are unique to the production and supply of their 
own good, and very different from the other component, so there is no prospect of technical 
spillover. Thus, only through the producer’s own process innovation investments can it lower 
its own operating costs.3 
                                                 
2 The alternative of quantity competition results in the market collapsing with the firms setting zero output 
(Sonnenschein 1968; Dobson 1992).  
3 We are assuming here that innovation leading to cost reduction is deterministic in the sense that expenditure on 















To reduce notation and without further loss of generality, we set the composite industry’s 
marginal cost parameter and the base level cost parameter for the two component monopolists 
to zero, so respectively k = 0 and ̅ = 0. Regarding consumer demand for the composite good, 
we normalise market size and price sensitivity to unity, so then a = 1 and b = 1 and thus Q = 1 
– p1 – p2. Thereby we focus attention on the component monoplists’ decisions on their levels 
of unit cost reduction, x1 and x2, and their prices, p1 and p2, as the key decision variables that 
determine market outcomes for given realisations of the efficiency improvement parameter . 
In respect of the timing of decisions, both cost reduction investments and prices are set 
simultaneously and are independently determined by the two component producers unless a 
cooperative agreement allows for coordinated joint determination. We view each component 
producer’s simultaneous choice of innovation effort and price as fixed in anticipation of the 
subsequent demand from the composite good industry. Specifically, innovation requires upfront 
investment expenditure as an irreversible sunk cost made independently and unobserved by the 
other industry participants when making their own decisions. 
We model innovation effort and prices as Nash equilibrium outcomes from a one shot 
game with all operational decisions made at the same ti e under complete information, so 
demand and cost structures are common knowledge. However, we allow for consideration of 
different objective functions for the component producers in this stage game. We start with the 
two ways in which Cournot originally conceived the complementary monopoly situation. First, 
as the base case, the two monopoly producers are indepe dent profit maximisers. Second, the 
two monopoly producers make coordinated decisions t maximise their joint profits as if fused 
into a single combined monopolist. This second case is the benchmark case because in a single 
unified monopoly represents the highest level of achievable economic welfare in this industry 
setting (assuming that a regulator does not intervene to mandate perfectly competitive 
behaviour). The comparison of the two cases highlights the extent to which independent profit 
maximising behaviour harms welfare resulting from prices being set excessively high and cost 
reduction effort set unduly low compared to decision  based on joint profit maximisation.  
Joint profit maximisation on the market decisions might be desirable but not achievable. 
For example, the respective business owners of the complementary monopolists might not be 
prepared to merge their businesses and market collusion might not be feasible in the absence of 
a mechanism to support a fully collusive agreement. If so, we consider how the owners might 
instead seek to shape the contracts of their managers in a way that provides for more favourable 
outcomes than the alternative arising from blunt independent profit maximising.  















managers focus on the extent of innovation effort for its own sake, alongside profit 
considerations. We model strategic delegation of this nature, with manager contracts 
determined in advance of operational decisions, as subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in 
two situations to draw comparisons with the base and benchmark cases. First, we examine the 
two sets of business owners independently determining their respective manager contracts with 
the intention of satisfying their own profit maximising objectives. This is the standard approach 
in the literature on strategic delegation, but turns out to be even more harmful to societal 
welfare than the base case of independent profit maximising behaviour. Second, as an 
alternative means of strategic delegation, we consider joint determination of manager 
incentives through industrywide commitments supported by both sets of business owners. 
4. Profit Maximising Outcomes 
This section derives and compares the outcomes for the cases of independent and joint 
profit maximising behaviour. The respective set of outcomes will serve as useful yardsticks by 
which to make comparisons with the outcomes from the strategic delegation cases considered 
in the next section.  
 
4.1 Independent profit maximising behaviour 
As the base case, we consider the component producers simultaneously and 
independently determining their respective prices and innovation efforts to maximise their own 
profits. Using the above assumptions, the profit function for component monopolist i is  
  = ( − ) −  = ( + )1 −  −  − 
/2 (1)
Maximising profit with respect to cost-reduction effort and price levels, the necessary first-
order conditions are 
 





= 1 − 2 −  −  = 0 (3)
Solving the set of four first-order conditions shows, with  ≥ 1 necessary for non-negative 
prices, the Nash equilibrium outcomes (designated with the superscript N) for the amount of 




























We can note that the equilibrium innovation effort is decreasing in  (i.e. 
/ < 0) 
as expected since the parameter captures the degree of difficulty and expense in implementing 
process innovation, but which also entails the equilibrium prices increasing in  (i.e. 
/ >
0) as the monopolists pass on the higher innovation costs to the composite goods makers. 
However, their profitability suffers as innovation costs rise with the equilibrium unit mark-up, 

 + 
 = /(3 − 2), decreasing in . The direction of these effects will be common to all 
the cases we examine, but the magnitudes will be diff rent for the different equilibrium 
outcomes. 
Using (4) and (5), we can determine the remaining market outcomes in this case. For 
convenience, Table 1 (second column) summarises all these outcomes. These cover the 
quantity demanded,  , the amount of investment that each monopolist makes on cost 
reduction, 
, the profit each firm makes, 
, the combined industry profits, Π =  + , 
the total consumer surplus,  !, and the total economic welfare, ", as the sum of industry 
profits (i.e. producer surplus) and consumer surplus. 
 
– Table 1 near here – 
 
4.2 Joint Profit Maximising Behaviour 
Following in the spirit of Cournot, we next examine the outcomes under joint profit 
maximisation, equivalent to the fusion of the two mnopolists into a single merged entity. The 
joint profit of the two component monopolists from the perspective of monopolist i is  
 Π =  +  =  +  −  −  −  − 




Maximising the joint profit with respect to the two innovation-induced cost reduction levels 
and two price levels, the necessary first-order conditions are 
 Π





= 1 − 2 − 2 −  −  = 0 (8)















(as a natural default position given the monopolists’ ymmetry and requiring  ≥ 2 to be non-
negative) reveals the merger-equivalent equilibrium choices and resulting market outcomes, 
which we designate with superscript M and report in Table 1 (third column).  
Contrasting the choices and resulting market outcomes from independent profit 
maximising behaviour (from Table 1 second column) ad joint profit maximising behaviour 
(from Table 1 third column) allows us to establish the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. Joint rather than independent profit maximising behaviour provides for higher 
industry profits, increased consumer surplus, and improved efficiency arising from greater 
investment in process innovation.  
Proof. Direct comparisons of the equilibrium outcomes show respectively that Π# > Π , 




. (See Appendix Table A1 for proofs to all propositi ns). 
 
This finding extends Cournot’s (1838, p.103) insight that “the composite commodity will 
always be made more expensive, by reason of separation of interests than by reason of the 
fusion of monopolies.” Independent profit maximisaton results in negative externality effects, 
where each producer in setting a high price does not consider the harm on demand for the other 
producer, leading to inefficiently high prices. This so-called “Cournot effect” is the horizontal 
equivalent of “double marginalisation” in a successive monopoly vertical supply chain, albeit 
with simultaneous rather than sequential price mark-ups (Nalebuff 2003). However, when the 
two complementary producers collude, they internalise these effects and lower prices with a 
bundled offer that benefits consumers, unlike in olgopoly where collusion amongst competing 
producers results in higher prices.  
Thus, the strategic interaction effect of independent profit maximisation is that 
component prices are too high resulting in lower sales of the composite good. However, in our 
context, this has an important knock-on consequence for the extent of process innovation with 
cost-reduction effort directly linked to the equilibrium sales level. This is evident from the first-
order condition in respect of the choice of innovative effort which in both cases is exactly the 
same with / = Π/ 	= 1 −  −  −  = 0, which implies that  = /  since 
 = 1 −  − . Accordingly, with lower equilibrium sales resulting from inefficiently high 
component prices then there is also reduced innovative effort compared to when prices are 
jointly coordinated. Thus, it is not just that independent profit maximisation lowers profits 















(which harms consumers), but that productive efficien y is less than it would be under joint 
profit maximisation.  
Proposition 1 shows that the respective owners of the component producers have a vested 
interest in merging the two monopolists to release the trapped added value and thereby enhance 
the company valuations. Moreover, if there were no risk of entry or foreseeable change in the 
structure of the market then presumably competition authorities would allow a merger. In 
practice, though, authorities have been reluctant to rely on the Cournot effect argument in 
complementary producer mergers especially if these might lock-in market power. For example, 
the European Commission blocked the GE/Honeywell merger in 2001 with concerns about 
enhanced bundling power (Choi 2008; Spulber 2017). There might also be other practical 
reasons why the two businesses might not be able to merge, such as ownership restrictions (e.g. 
on foreign ownership) or unduly complex and/or fragmented ownership structures which make 
share trading difficult (Heller 2008). 
If merger were not possible or palatable to the owners then the alternative for obtaining 
joint profit maximisation would be through collusion. Again, competition authorities might not 
be averse to a horizontal pricing agreement between complementors if there were likely to be 
material benefits for consumers. Nevertheless, there might be two key practical reasons that 
make coordination difficult. First, each monopolist will have a private incentive to deviate from 
any collusive agreement to keep prices low, because it can gain additional profit by 
surreptitiously raising its own price. In the present context of a one shot game there is no threat 
of retaliation to sustain collusion (such as there might be through an infinitely repeated game), 
and so any agreement might unravel, leaving the two monopolists to end up with the Nash 
equilibrium outcomes from independent profit maximisat on. Secondly, both parties would 
need to agree the individual price levels, as prices h re are only determined in aggregate (i.e. 
the combination of the two prices passed on to the composite good makers). The default, as we 
have assumed above given their symmetry, is that they agree to set the same prices so have an 
equal share of joint profit. However, in practice, the two monopolists might not be so 
accommodating in their negotiations and they might each demand more than an equal share, 
resulting in disagreement and a failure to conclude a collusive arrangement. 
Consequently, if merger or collusion is not feasible then we are left to consider whether 
the firms might be able to undertake some form of prior strategic action to favourably influence 
these operational decisions. To this end, we examine next how the business owners might 
influence the outcomes through designing remuneration packages to motivate their managers to 
















5. Strategic Delegation Outcomes 
This section extends the analysis to a two-stage game. In the first stage, the two sets of 
business owners simultaneously determine an incentive contract for their respective manager 
based on a linear combination of profits and cost-reduction effort, which they might be inclined 
to make publicly visible if this aids their CSR credentials (Kolk and Perego 2014; Maas and 
Rosendaal 2015; Glass Lewis 2016). In the second stage, being aware of each other’s contracts, 
the two managers unilaterally decide on their price and targeted cost-reduction levels.  
We begin with the case of independent (non-cooperativ ) strategic delegation where each 
set of business owners separately decides on the incent ve contracts for their own manager. We 
then consider the case of collaborative (cooperative) strategic delegation where both set of 
business owners set the same structure of incentive contracts. With complete information, 
where there is clarity and understanding in the market about the managers’ contracts, we derive 
and then compare the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes for these two cases.  
 
5.1 Independent Strategic Delegation 
Following Overvest and Veldman (2008), Veldman et al. (2014), and Veldman and 
Gaalman (2015), each set of owners provides their respective manager with a contract that 
depends on a linear combination of a profit and process innovation bonus with the total 
compensation expressed as the salary function ! =  + $, where $ is the monetary return 
per unit of realised operational cost reductions.4 Accordingly, $  represents the weight the 
owners attach to the firm’s level of innovative effort, so the higher (respectively, lower) is this 
strategic remuneration variable then the more (respectively, less) the manager will direct the 
firm’s resources towards innovation. We allow the owners to determine the sign and magnitude 
of this variable, recognising that a positive value provides extra encouragement to innovative 
effort and lowering operational costs while a negative value discourages innovative effort with 
a view to leaving operational costs high while saving on investment expenditure.  
We start by considering independent (non-cooperative) choices made by the respective 
owners as the weight they attach to their respectiv firm’s level of cost-reduction effort. The 
game structure now changes into a two-stage game. Firstly, each set of owners simultaneously 
                                                 
4 Following Fershtman and Judd (1987), the actual payment to the manager takes the form % + &!, with % > 0 
and & > 0 as exogenously specified constants. Maximising this payment function is equivalent to maximising ! 















determines their respective value for $. Then, the two managers simultaneously choose pric 
and targeted cost-reduction levels with their intention to maximise their own respective 
compensation levels. With complete and perfect information, the appropriate solution concept 
is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), solved by backward induction.  
In the second stage, both managers choose process innovation and price levels to 
maximise their respective salary functions:  
 ! = ( − ) −  + $ = ( + )1 −  −  − 
/2 + $ (9)
The necessary first-order conditions are 
 !





= 1 − 2 −  −  = 0 (11)
Note that the incentive structure works directly on the innovation effort choice but not on 
the price choice, since !/ = / , and so any impact on price is only indirectly 
through how the cost-reduction effort level affects the firm’s marginal cost. Clearly, !/ >
(<)	/  for $ > (<)	0 . Solving the set of four first-order conditions, with  ≥ 1 
necessary for non-negative prices, shows the second-stage equilibrium choices to be 
 
($, $) =






( − 1)( + $) − (2 − 1)$
(3 − 2)
 (13)
The effect of $ and $ are positive on the targeted cost-reduction level selected by firm 
i’s manager, but the strength of the cross effect is very small compared to the influence of the 
own effect. In contrast, $  and $  have opposing effects on the price level chosen by the 
manager, where the own effect is negative while the cross effect is positive but weaker.  
Anticipating these outcomes chosen by the managers, each firm’s owners determine the 
innovation effort weighting parameter $ in the first stage using these second-stage outcomes 
when maximising the firm’s profit function: 
 ($, $) = ( − ) −  = ( + )1 −  −  − /2
=
(2 − 1) + $






Optimising with respect to $  and rearranging the first-order condition provides the 
















( − 1)( + $)
9 − 8 + 1
 (15)
Solving for the equilibrium values, the owners of each firm set their manager the following 






Observing the symmetry, with $*+ = $*+, and substituting this equilibrium value back into the 
second stage outcomes, (12) and (13), reveals the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes under 
independent delegation which are collected and report d in Table 1 (penultimate column).  
Clearly, far from encouraging managers to pursue effici ncy-enhancing innovation, the 
owners instead discourage innovative effort by penalising managers in their compensation 
packages, by assigning a negative value for $. Independent strategic delegation by the owners 
thereby works to curtail investment and encourage inefficient production with high unit costs.  
In essence, owners incentivise managers to adopt wasteful-but-cheap technology and methods 
rather than efficient-but-expensive technology and methods.  The reason is that committing to a 
raised unit cost in turn commits the producer to a higher unit price and puts pressure on the 
complementary producer to correspondingly lower its price and so not reduce final goods 
demand.  However, because both complementary producers a t in the same self-interested way 
then the result is both firms’ prices and margins increase but final goods demand falls to such 
an extent that everyone – owners, consumers and society – are worse off compared to the 
absence of strategic delegation by both firms, as summarised by the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. Independent strategic delegation by owners penalises cost-reducing effort and 
results in managers choosing lower process innovatin effort, higher prices and less output 
compared to decisions based on independent profit maxi ising behaviour to the extent that 
industry profits, consumer surplus and societal welfar  are all lower.  
 







#, *+ < , Π*+ < Π,  !*+ <  !, and "*+ < ". (See Table A1).  
 
Somewhat analogous to Gilbert and Cvsa (2003), who examine investment in a 
successive (vertical) monopoly situation, there aretwo forces working in tandem driving 
underinvestment in this non-cooperative setting. First, both sets of owners do not take into 















translate into lower component prices and raised demand that benefits the whole supply chain. 
Second, there is a mutual hold-up effect with each set of owners wanting the other set to entice 
their manager to increase innovative effort, which then allows them, in a free-riding sense, to 
reduce their own firm’s innovation effort, and take advantage to raise price by being more 
inefficient. With both sets of owners thinking the same way, then they both commit to 
penalising their respective managers for undertaking innovative effort. Thereby, both firms 
undertake even less innovation than they would withindependent profit maximising behaviour. 
This finding is directly opposite to the results in Cournot oligopoly, where Overvest and 
Veldman (2008), Veldman et al. (2014), and Veldman and Gaalman (2015) show that owners 
set positive innovation bonuses to encourage their managers to reduce costs. However, both 
cases have in common a prisoner’s dilemma structure, where independent delegation is 
individually a dominant strategic choice but not in the firms’ joint interests.5 Yet, the welfare 
outcomes are starkly different. In Cournot oligopoly, the positive innovation bonus induces the 
managers to raise efficiency and output, which lowers industry profits but raises consumer 
surplus and social welfare. In our complementary monop ly case, though, the outcome is a 
triple loss where industry profits, consumer surplus and social welfare are all lower.  
5.2 Collaborative Strategic Delegation 
As a contrast to independent delegation, we consider collaborative delegation. Here, the 
two sets of owners cooperate in determining how much they reward their managers for cost-
reduction effort but still have their respective managers independently (i.e. non-cooperatively) 
determine the actual amount of innovation and corresponding price levels.  
While perhaps not easy to coordinate, we envisage that joint determination and a shared 
focus on a common incentive level to promote cost reduction might come about through 
different possible drivers. First, collaborative strategic delegation could represent a form of 
“semi-collusion”, where the two sets of owners by their own volition recognise their mutual 
interdependence and coordinate on a common incentive s ructure to motivate and reward their 
managers. For example, the owners might jointly make publicly pledged CSR and 
sustainability commitments promoting waste reduction and improving resource efficiency, but 
then leave their managers to make independent non-co perative operational decisions. 
Secondly, a coordinated approach on managerial incentives might arise through regulatory 
obligation or pressure. For example, the government could mandate or coordinate a 
                                                 
5 By considering the asymmetric case where $ = 0, it is easy to show that each set of owners always prefers to 















sustainability focus with accountability and targets for reducing waste and lessening harm to 
the environment through promoting efficiency-enhancing innovation, made more credible when 
backed up by the threat of taxes or other penalties if targets are not met. Moreover, such 
government involvement would have clear public support when it clearly benefits both 
consumers and the environment. Thirdly, even without governmental involvement, pressure to 
coordinate on common sustainability objectives might arise from within the supply chain. In 
particular, the downstream assembly industry has an interest to ensure the monopoly 
component suppliers do not underinvest in cost-reduction effort, since higher prices will lead to 
less demand, shrinking sales, and displacement of marginal assembly firms forced out of 
business. For example, as their customers, the downstream firms might lobby for the 
component suppliers to adopt a shared purpose with common resource efficiency and waste 
reduction targets, then formalised as industrywide CSR commitments.  
Thus, by the medium of public joint commitments, credibly related to sustainability 
obligations, we consider the owners of the two comple entary suppliers making a first-stage 
choice to set a common parameter $  with the objective of maximising combined industry 
profits. The second-stage outcomes, where the managers make independent choices over the 
innovation and price levels are the same as (12) and (13) but with the restriction that $ = $ =









 − 1 − $
3 − 2
 (18)
Anticipating these levels, the owners in the first stage coordinate on setting $ to maximise 
combined sector profits: 
 Π($) = ( +  +  + )(1 −  − ) − ( + )/2 
=




Taking the first order condition where Π/$ = 0 and solving reveals that the owners set 
the following pro-innovation incentive to their respective managers under “collaborative 





Substituting this equilibrium value back into the second stage outcomes determines the 















(final column), where the necessary requirement for non-negative prices is  ≥ 4/3. 
By setting a common incentive and reward for cost-reduction effort, the two sets of 
owners internalise the positive externality effect of innovative effort for each other, where dual 
cost reduction allows for lowers prices, higher quantity and increased combined profits. In 
addition, by coordinating on the common innovation ncentive, the owners help alleviate the 
mutual hold-up effect by jointly pushing their respctive managers to match each other in being 
more efficient, rather than seeking to free ride on the other’s innovation effort and behaving 
opportunistically to raise price from being more inefficient. The upshot is more innovation 
effort than under either independent strategic delegation or independent profit maximisation, 
and a second-best outcome if full cooperation or merger is not feasible: 
 
Proposition 3. Collaborative strategic delegation rewards cost reduction and results in 
managers choosing more process innovation effort, lwer prices and more output compared to 
decisions arising under independent profit maximising behaviour or independent strategic 
delegation, and so represents a second-best outcome pared to full coordination or merger.  
 













*+ , # > -+ >  > *+ , Π# >
Π-+ > Π > Π*+,  !# >  !-+ >  ! >  !*+, and "# > "-+ > " > "*+. (Table A1). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates this result, showing the best response functions in prices and 
equilibrium outcomes under each of the four scenarios. For independently set operational 
decisions, the best response functions takes the form / = [(1 − )( − 1) − $]/(2 −
1). Compared to the best response functions under independent profit maximisation (shown as 
/
  and where $ = 0 ), independent strategic delegation leads to underiv stment in cost-
reduction effort which shifts out the price response functions (shown as /
*+  and where 
$ = $
*+ < 0). This is because prices for complementary monopolists are strategic substitutes 
(i.e. downward sloping best response functions) and investment in innovative effort makes the 
firm soft by allowing the other firm to take advantge and maintain a higher price and boost its 
own profit. Thus, the firms adopt a “lean and hungry look” strategy, in the terminology of 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). In contrast, collaborative delegation raises innovation and shifts 
in the best response functions (shown as /
-+ and where $ = $
-+ > 0), but the equilibrium 















curve and the set of Pareto efficient outcomes where  +  = ( − 2)/(2( − 1)). 
– Figure 1 near here – 
If semi-collusion is feasible then it begs the question why full cooperation might not be 
feasible. As explained in section 4.2, collusion on pricing might be difficult when the two firms 
have to agree on their exact prices levels and eachh s an incentive for hidden action to deviate 
and surreptitiously raise its price. The same private incentive to deviate exists on an agreement 
between both sets of owners on the common incentive they set their managers for undertaking 
process innovation. However, joint public declarations reduce the scope for reneging, 
especially if there is reputational harm or some other implicit penalty. In particular, owners 
might be concerned about a government or public backlash if they fail to support resource 
efficiency for the sake of sustainability. In the same vein, requirements for managers to 
formally report on CSR (e.g. in line with EC Directive 2014/95/EU or ISO 26000 Guidance 
Standard on Social Responsibility) might also help su port industrywide commitments.  
In this light, we might see genuine attempts, beyond greenwash, for industries and supply 
chains to innovate with clear joint targets on reducing costs and wastage as possible 
commitment mechanisms. This might especially apply to industries viewed as environmentally 
unfriendly, such as mining (Dashwood 2014), or where waste is high in the public conscience, 
like food waste. With shared objectives and the ability to monitor each other, firms might avoid 
the temptation to deviate and free ride on the innovati n effort of other parties in the supply 
chain to reduce waste and increase efficiency. This can help avoid a ruinous prisoner’s 
dilemma situation where underinvestment in innovation harms industry profits, consumer 
welfare, and the environment. Thus, a clear role exists for industry standards, voluntary 
agreements and self-regulation to work together to overcome opportunism and support welfare-
raising collaboration that benefits the triple bottom line (Haufler 2001; King and Lenox 2000). 
Through this means, innovation-led efficiency enhancing approaches can support sustainability. 
6. Conclusion 
Our analysis calls for collaborative solutions within supply chains to encourage 
investment in process innovation. We see the best pro pect for this being in respect of process 
innovation that promotes sustainability, with industry and societal interests aligned and having 
the support of government and the public concerned about environmental harm and resource 















Commitment 2025 is a voluntary agreement that commits the UK food industry to collaborative 
action in cutting the resources needed to provide food and drink by one-fifth over ten years 
(WRAP 2017). The broader aim is to achieve UN Sustainable Development Goal 12.3 by 2030 
in halving food waste. The agreement includes collab r tive effort on whole chain resource 
efficiency and builds on previous successes in reducing food and packaging waste across 
multiple supply chains. The emphasis is on innovating through lean operations as the most 
effective way to reduce costs, food waste, and greenhouse gas emissions (WRAP 2011). The 
UK government will, if necessary, pressure reticent producers to participate (Quinn 2017).  
Finally, we recognise that our parsimonious model cl arly understates the complexity of 
manufacturing supply chains, but our key findings appear robust to a number of extensions. 
First, we could follow Veldman et al. (2014) and allow for stochastic innovation, which 
effectively raises  as the probability of success declines, serving to provide an even stronger 
need for collaboration on innovation effort. Second, we could allow for n (> 2) complementary 
monopolists, in a similar vein to Overvest and Veldman (2008) who consider an -firm 
Cournot oligopoly. As n increases, we expect the cumulative problem of underi vestment and 
excessive pricing to become even more acute, so again a greater need for collaboration on 
innovation effort. Moreover, we cannot rely on mergers fixing the problem since, as Gaudet 
and Salant (1992) demonstrate, incentives for endogen us mergers breakdown when there are 
more than two complementary monopolists. Thirdly, following Bergstrom (1978), we could 
allow for variable proportions rather than fixed pro ortions technology in the assembly industry. 
Even so, as long as the component producers maintain a complementary demand relationship 
then we would expect the same pricing and innovative externality effects to prevail and so a 
need for collaborative strategic delegation. Fourthly, the downstream industry could also be a 
monopoly and, while vertically coordinated price bargaining might resolve the pricing 
externality problem, there could still be value in committing to coordinated innovation effort to 
overcome free-riding incentives on process innovatin investments. Future research, though, 
might wish to consider innovation incentives across verlapping or competing supply chains. 
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Table 1. Complementary Monopoly Equilibrium Outcomes 
Equilibrium Outcomes Independent Profit 
Maximisation  
(Nash Equilibrium Outcomes) 
Joint Profit Maximisation 
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Appendix. Proofs for Propositions 1-3 
 
Table A1. Equilibrium Outcome Comparisons 
Joint Profit Maximisation (M) versus Collaborative 
Delegation (CD) 
Collaborative Delegation (CD) versus 
Independent Profit Maximisation (N) 
Independent Profit Maximisation (N) versus 
Independent Strategic Delegation (ID) 
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Strategic Incentives for Complementary Producers to Innovate for 
Efficiency and Support Sustainability 
 
Highlights 
• Complementary producers face conflicting private and joint incentives to innovate 
• Independent decision-making results in complementors underinvesting in innovation 
• Industrywide commitments to innovate for cost reduction can counter underinvestment 
• Governments can encourage innovation with industrywide waste reduction targets 
• Waste reduction commitments support innovation, lean operations and sustainability 
 
 
